RAF STRATEGIC BOMBING: ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY
“This time, gentlemen, we are to look upon the entire city as a tactical target.”

Bomber Command would prove ineffective in its efforts prior to 1942 due to internal matters. Following 1942, and the correction of these matters, the operation and use of the force would result in inefficient results.
1939–1942

• Britain was unprepared for a strategic bombing offensive in 1939.
• The RAF was divisive on policies and doctrines, which diluted its already miniscule forces.
• Bomber Command lacked the adequate technologies required to partake in a bombing campaign.
• Ineffective intelligence analysis meant that bombers were not being used effectively.
1943–1945

• Established doctrine meant Bomber Command could commit bombers to a specific focus (primarily morale).

• The introduction of new, heavy bombers and advanced technologies meant bombing was more accurate and efficient.

• More efficient dissection of intelligence meant improvements could be made more quickly.
British Bombing Survey and the US Strategic Bombing Survey

- Both surveys analyze the effect of bombing on morale.
- Morale did not lessen in proportion to amount of bombs dropped.
- Medium bombed cities exhibited less morale than heavily bombed cities.
- Confounding of evidence means it is difficult to determine why this is the case, but specific factors can be identified.
Results

- Strategic bombing was ineffective prior to 1942, when the proper technology and policies came into existence.
- Following 1942, RAF strategic bombing was effective, yet not efficient, at reducing civilian morale.
Opening Quote taken from Philip Gray’s (186 Sqn RAF) autobiography:

To read the full thesis or post inquiries regarding the research behind this project, feel free to message:

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