THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS
Analyzing the US Foreign Policy Approach to Islamic Fundamentalism from 1979-1981

Alexander Smith – 1001196528
Supervisor: Prof. Timothy Sayle
September 2017 – April 2018
University of Toronto

Source: New Yorker – Madeline Drexler
Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Carter Administration distanced itself from Ayatollah’s Khomeini’s Islamic revolutionaries.

This approach directly contrasts with the American support of the Afghan Mujahideen in response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Research Questions:
1) Why did the US support Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan while opposing them in Iran?
2) How did Cold War geopolitics and the desire to solidify spheres of influence shape the US approach?
3) In what ways did the perception of these groups to the American public and American policy makers influence the American approach? How did the Islamic fundamentalists view of the US effect their willingness to conduct diplomacy?
Thesis: “Carter’s policy of supporting Islamic fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan clearly contrasts with the US opposition to Khomeini’s Islamic government. Primary source documents from the Carter and Reagan administrations make clear that this inconsistency was motivated by two main factors: the severity of the threat of Soviet expansionism and the American perception of and relationship with each state’s Islamic fundamentalists.”
This research process used a variety of primary source databases including:

1) *The Foreign Relations of the United States*
2) *The Carter Presidential Library*
3) *The Reagan Presidential Library*
4) *The National Security Archive*
5) *The Central Intelligence Agency Digital Collection*
6) *The American Presidency Project*

Letter from Robert Perea (13 years old) to President Jimmy Carter advocating for grain sanctions to be placed on Iran. [Source: Carter Presidential Library]
Conclusions:

1) The Severity of the Threat:
- “The reality of Afghanistan becoming a Soviet satellite forced the US to compromise its political and cultural values to support Islamic fundamentalist groups, whereas attempts to curtail Soviet influence in Iran were largely pre-cautionary and the threat of an Iran-USSR alliance never materialized.”

2) The American Perception of and Relationship with each Islamic Fundamentalist Group:
- “America’s willingness to compromise with the Afghan mujahideen was also due to their shared goal of repelling the Soviets. This goal also pushed the mujahideen to ignore their disapproval of Western culture and work with the Americans, which they regarded as the “lesser of two evils.” This contrasts with the Iranian revolutionaries, which saw the US as the “Great Satan” and planned to “resist America until [their] last breath,” thus limiting the chance of rapprochement.”